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RECLAIMING THE ANCESTORS OF SIMULATION THEORY


REDISCOVERING EMPATHY: AGENCY, FOLK PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES. By Karsten R. Stueber. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2006. Pp. 276.


Collingwood’s account of re-enactment is not often invoked as a source of inspiration in contemporary action theory. It was thus a pleasant surprise to come across an attempt to connect current research in cognitive psychology with the historical debate about the nature of action explanation that took place in mid-century and to reclaim the centrality of Collingwood’s work to contemporary theorizing about the nature of folk-psychological explanation. 
Stueber’s Rediscovering Empathy articulates an interesting and highly original defence of empathy as a distinctive method of explanation in the social sciences. In so doing it contests a philosophical trend that has tended to dismiss the method of empathetic identification for relying on an implausibly Cartesian conception of the mind and on the employment of mysterious telepathic powers that lie beyond the scope of verification. Stueber’s defence of empathy unfolds in the context of the contemporary debate in analytic philosophy of mind between “simulation theory” and “theory theory”. Oversimplifying the matter somewhat, the issue at stake for theory theorists and simulation theorists is whether the ability to predict the behaviour of other human beings depends on the employment of a theory about how human beings typically tend to react in certain circumstances (theory theory), or whether it is only necessary to empathise with them and ask how we would act if we found ourselves in their situation. In most cases simulation theory and theory theory have been presented as empirical hypotheses to be tested in experimental conditions. The testing ground for this debate has been developmental psychology where experiments carried out under controlled conditions have shown that whereas children around the age of three are unable to accurately predict the behaviour of agents who hold beliefs different from their own, children aged five and over have no problems in performing this task. The question at stake is whether the five year old as opposed to the three year old ability to predict the behaviour of persons with a different set of beliefs from their own depends on the possession of a fairly sophisticated theory about how people generally act, (as the theory theorists claims) or whether this ability is connected less with the child’s cognitive development and more with the child’s emotional development, i.e., with his or her ability to empathise with others and take their point of view (as simulationists claim).
Stueber describes the perspective of the theory theorist as a “detached”, external, third person perspective that ignores the internal monologue that moved the agent to act. The perspective of simulation theory, by contrast, is an “engaged” egocentric perspective that reconstructs other people’s thoughts by vicariously undergoing their thought processes and thus enables one to understand other agents as responding to reasons. Stueber traces the ancestry of the contemporary debate between simulation theorists and theory theorists to the early twentieth century distinction between Verstehen and Erklären and seeks to vindicate the claims of simulation theory by appealing to arguments that he believes are central to the philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. Whilst in the contemporary debate the evidence in support of simulation theory has been drawn primarily from studies in developmental psychology, and is thus evidence of an essentially empirical nature, Stueber sees himself as providing a priori support for the claims of simulation theory against theory theory. His defence of simulation theory, unlike the arguments often adduced in the contemporary debate, is carried out entirely from the philosophical armchair. In fact, one of the claims often repeated in the book is that whilst philosophy cannot be carried out from a perspective of cosmic exile from the findings of natural science, it is an error to think that it is possible to dispense with traditional armchair philosophising altogether. Indeed it is only by appealing to arguments of an a priori nature that it is possible to settle the debate between simulation and theory theorists; it is thus traditional armchair philosophising that saves the day for the simulationist.





The philosophical impetus behind Stueber’s historically informed defence of simulation is to resist the eliminativist tendencies implicit in the position of theory theory. For the theory theorist beliefs and desires are merely internal causes of actions. Since theory theorists regard beliefs and desires in this way, they find no need, when formulating an explanation of why an agent acted as he or she did, to appeal to the notion that the agent was responding to reasons. From the perspective of the theory theorist the assumption of rationality is thus dispensable. Stueber agrees with the theory theorist that some supporters of the standard model of rationality over-idealised human agents and were thus guilty as charged of “logical fetishism”. Dray, for example, is said to conflate “the question of (i) whether humans are rational animals, with the question of (ii) whether or not all of our actions conform to or approximate to a large extent normative standards that have been articulated by what we regard as the best theories of rationality.” (p. 49) In my view Stueber is slightly ungenerous to Dray. The claim that the “standard model of rationality” as understood by W. H. Dray requires all actions to exemplify rational norms, does not take into account the very special status that the concept of “action” enjoys in Collingwood’s philosophical approach, the very approach that Dray took himself to be explicating. I shall return to this point later. Having pointed out some of the failures of the standard conception of rationality, Stueber suggests that we ought to treat the concept of a rational animal as a concept “characterized by a certain bipolar dimension of evaluation. Similar to a statement’s being capable of being true or false, a rational animal is capable of acting rationally or irrationally.” (p. 61) Yet, whilst Stueber believes that some proponents of the standard conception of rationality were guilty of over-rationalizing the human agent, he by no means agrees with the theory theorist that the assumption of rationality is eliminable from folk-psychological discourse and he convincingly argues that empirical findings demonstrating that humans fail to conform to rational norms are insufficient to eliminate rational norms from folk-psychological explanations. It is with these background assumptions in mind that Stueber proceeds to articulate his defence of re-enactive empathy. He is aware that a defence of the rationality assumption does not lend automatic support to the key thesis of the book, i.e. the centrality of empathy in folk-psychological explanations. As he says “it has to be stressed that recognizing rationality as a central notion to our folk-psychological practices and to understanding agency does not logically entail an argument for empathy or simulation…. Certainly a theory of rational agency would differ from a merely “causal-psychological” theory in that it would also contain some general normative principles. Yet the different epistemic status of these general principles, lawlike generality versus normative universality, alone does not suffice to show that our understanding of other minds essentially involves the first-person perspective.” (p.110) 
Stueber offers a number of considerations in support of the epistemic centrality of empathy in folk-psychological explanations. He argues that an appeal to the normativity of reason is by itself insufficient to offer strong resistance against the eliminativist tendencies implicit in theory theory. For, so Stueber argues, it is possible to deal with normative universality within the detached perspective of theory theory:  “…even if one admits that rationality is a central notion to our folk-psychological practices, as I have urged, a theory theorist could easily accommodate his position to that fact.” (p. 110) If the eliminativist tendencies of theory theory are to be resisted, one needs to argue in favour of the centrality of the first person perspective in folk-psychological explanation. A defence of the explanatory autonomy of folk-psychological explanation thus requires additional arguments linking the assumption of rationality with the first person perspective. I am inclined to believe that Stueber underestimates the resistance that a normative account of action explanation can provide against the theory theorist. The view that theory theory may contain the intellectual resources to incorporate normative considerations, may be due to the fact, as mentioned earlier, that Stueber’s defence of empathy is articulated against the background of a causalist consensus according to which rational explanations are species of causal explanations. Again I shall return to this point later. 
To establish a link between the assumption of rationality and the epistemic centrality of empathy, Stueber appeals to a number of arguments inspired by R. G. Collingwood. Unlike the arguments advanced by contemporary simulation theorists, these arguments are not of an empirical nature for they “require appeal to a priori considerations that reveal empathy to be epistemically essential for our understanding of rational agency.” (p. 131) Prominent amongst these is the argument for the essential contextuality of thought (p. 155 ff). According to this argument, formal theories of inference alone cannot be springs of action. Just as Kantian moral laws cannot by themselves motivate an agent to perform a specific act, unless the agent has undergone the kind of Aristotelian training of character that ensures that one recognises that e.g., helping the lady to cross the street, is what the abstract moral principle requires in the particular circumstances, so too knowledge of formal inferences leaves agents emotionally disengaged. To illustrate the point Stueber uses the example of a person sitting on a beach on a glorious sunny day. The person sees the blue sky and the rough sea and hears a boy in the water crying for help, yet he fails to intervene because he does not make the connection between the rough sea, the crying of the boy and the need to intervene.  Conative and epistemic states fail to explain action in the absence of some kind of emotional attunement to the situation. Simulation is what provides the missing link between knowledge of formal inference and reasons as springs of action. As Stueber puts it: “ What we do understand - using the method of simulation - I would like to suggest, are the aspects of the situation that constitute our reasons for responding emotionally in a certain way, or, to express it in a more neutral manner, the aspects of the situation that would allow such a response to be appropriate.” (p. 161) Just as we would be unable to respond morally to the needs of others if we lacked the kind of character that enabled us to recognise what is required in particular circumstances, so without the ability to empathise we would be unable to understand others as acting from reasons, even if we had access to general rules of inference. I find the ascription of the argument concerning the essential contextuality of thought to Collingwood rather surprising in the light of Collingwood’s oft-repeated claim that re-enactment is concerned purely with the propositional content of thought and that the only situation that is relevant to it is the “thought situation”. But once again I will leave a discussion of such interpretative issues until later. 





As hinted above, I have four interpretative bones of contention here. First I want to argue that Collingwood’s account of re-enactment was not presented as an answer to epistemological concerns about how we come to know the thought processes that lead people to act with a view to either predicting or retrodicting their behaviour. Secondly, I would question the view that a normative account of action explanation which does not adopt the egocentric perspective is unable to resist incorporation within the detached account of the theory theorist. Thirdly, I would question the claim that the standard conception of rationality needs to be substantively modified in order to escape the charge of logical fetishism. My fourth point concerns the nature of the relationship between epistemology and ontology that informs Stueber’s defence of the explanatory autonomy of folk-psychological explanations. These points are underpinned by what I take to be an insight which lies at the heart of Collingwood’s philosophy of history, even when if it is not fully spelled out in that context. Collingwood holds that a defence of the autonomy of mentalistic explanations must be articulated against the background of a “metaphysics without ontology” (EM, 17), a metaphysics which takes the principal task of philosophy to be that of making explicit the different forms of inference that inform the explanatory hypotheses articulated in different sciences and which takes these inferences to be definitive of what kind of things there are. Collingwood’s conception of metaphysics as an inquiry into different forms of experience provides the basis for a form of non-reductivism that has its roots in an incompatibilist conception of the relationship between reasons and causes that substantively differs from the position of Stueber, who may be best described as a compatibilist about reasons and causes. Let me take these points in turn. 
The debate about the exact philosophical point to be established by Collingwood’s account of re-enactment has a long pedigree. Back in the 1950s and 60s those who, like Gardiner,​[1]​ took Collingwood to be providing a method or tool for coming to know the thoughts of others accused him of ascribing the interpreter telepathic powers of access to the minds of others. Those who, Like Dray,​[2]​ defended Collingwood against this charge, claimed that his point was not epistemological but conceptual. Collingwood’s point was to establish not how we come to know the thoughts of others, but rather what we mean when we use the term “because” in the context of the explanation of action. When we explain something as an action, we do not connect two temporally distinct occurrences, but rather bring an occurrence under a different description. Thus when forensic scientists describe a particular occurrence as arson, they do not take the arson to be an occurrence that is temporally distinct from the fire. To describe something as “arson” is to appeal to a particular use of the term “cause” or “because”. In this particular sense of the term “cause” or “because”, to explain something means to afford a motive and thereby to establish a logical or conceptual connection between the explanandum (the fire) and the explanans (the reasons). It was an appeal to this sense of the term “because” that underpinned Collingwood’s cryptic and apparently baffling claim that when a historian knows what happened, he already knows why it happened. (IH, 214) Collingwood’s remark is incomprehensible from the perspective of a different kind of explanation, one in which the term “cause” or “because” is used not to uncover motives, but to connect temporally distinct events such as a fire and its temporally antecedent condition, e.g. the ignition of the match. But to describe x as arson is to imply that x was “caused” in a different sense of causation, i.e. in the sense of being motivated. If we accept that there is more than one sense of causation, or that explanation in different sciences employ different kinds of inferences (logical vs inductive), Collingwood’s claim that when a historian knows what happened he already knows why it happened, loses its mysterious aura.
Contemporary sympathisers with simulation theory should certainly be forgiven for assuming that re-enactment is an epistemological tool which enables us to entertain the thought processes of others off line, thus reconstructing their internal monologue without resorting to law-like generalisations formulated from an external perspective. Collingwood’s use of language was often loose and unguarded. His oft-repeated claim that actions have an “inside” that events lack certainly appears to suggest a bias towards an egocentric perspective in action explanation. But as soon as one scratches beneath the surface of the inside/outside metaphor, one can see that the re-enactment doctrine was provided to establish what it means to explain something as an action as opposed to a mere bodily movement or event, to show that action and event explanations have a different logical structure because they make use of different kinds of inferences. Interestingly Stueber acknowledges Dray’s defence of Collingwood, but either misunderstands it or rejects it:

Dray, the principal defender of Collingwood’s re-enactment view in the philosophy of history, insists explicitly in his defence of empathy against Hempel on its epistemically central function by declaring that “the point of the projection metaphor is… more plausibly interpreted as a logical one” – or as I would say an epistemic one. (p. 175)

Dray’s defence of Collingwood was precisely trying to distinguish the logical point of the projection metaphor from the epistemological interpretation that generated the charges raised by Gardiner et al., not to equate them, as Stueber does. Stueber, I suspect, is not misinterpreting Collingwood. He is disagreeing with him. As a result, the defence of the autonomy of folk-explanations which he develops is of a completely different ilk from the one articulated by Collingwood.
The second point I wish to discuss in some detail is Stueber’s claim that in order to resist the eliminativist tendencies implicit in theory theory one must not only endorse a theory of rational agency, but must also connect this theory with the egocentric perspective of empathy. Stueber’s argument appears to be that it is only by empathetically entertaining other agents’ thoughts that we can understand them as agents acting from reasons rather than as automata whose behaviour must be explained by referring to internal causes. Here, as we have seen earlier, Stueber might be regarded as objecting to a purely normative account of rational agency in the way in which an Aristotelian might object to Kant’s account of morality. In my view, to object to a normatively based theory of rationality in this way is to conflate two questions – a conceptual question about the logical structure of action explanation and a psychological question about why we are moved to act rationally. I take it that Collingwood’s account of re-enactment was not developed as an answer to a psychological question: “why do we act rationally?”, but to a semantic question: “what does it mean to act rationally?” Collingwood took rational action as datum to be explained, as a starting point for philosophical reflection. He thus saw himself as elucidating what it means to act rationally, and not why we should be motivated to act rationally. Further, this Aristotelian defence of empathy against a purely normative account of rational action is rather surprising in the context of Stueber’s claim to be developing arguments of a Collingwoodian kind. Collingwood’s was very clear that re-enactment applied purely to the propositional content of thought, not to the emotions, and that it is only the propositional content of thought, not the accompanying feeling, that is re-enactable. For Collingwood, the historian who seeks to understand why an ancient tribe did not cross a mountain chain seeks to explain this fact by appealing to the belief that the mountains were inhabited by evil spirits. But to understand why, from the perspective of the agent, it was rational to walk through a crocodile-infested swamp, rather than attempt a relatively unproblematic mountain crossing, only requires establishing a logical or conceptual connection between beliefs/desires pairs and actions. The historian needs to understand that the agents were afraid of the devils, he does not need to feel their fear. Collingwood is adamant that re-enactment applies only to the propositional content of thought, not to feelings or sensations (IH pp. 292 ff.).
The third point that I would like to explore is Stueber’s suggestion that the standard ascription of rationality needs to be modified in order to avoid the charge of logical fetishism. Stueber suggests that the standard conception of rationality subscribed to the view that all human actions are as they (rationally) ought to be and that this identification of is and ought gave rise to the criticism that the standard conception of rationality makes it impossible to claim that human beings may act for bad reasons. To be fair, Stueber does acknowledge that Collingwood himself was not guilty of this error (p. 60). However, I would like to point out exactly why this criticism does not apply to Collingwood, for this will also serve to highlight a fundamental difference between Collingwood’s defence of the autonomy of folk-psychological explanations and Stueber’s own. For Collingwood the concept of action was not an ordinary empirical concept; by action he did not understand “what human beings do”. The concept of “action” is rather to be understood as a meta-level concept that defines, a priori, the domain of enquiry of the sciences of the mind. The relationship between the concept of “action” and that of “event” is thus not a relationship of supervenience, but of contrasting descriptions that arise from the employment of different kinds of explanations, explanations that make use of different forms of inference. When we explain something rationally, we explain it as an action and when we explain something inductively, we explain it as an event. Thus the concept of action, for Collingwood, is not tied to the concept of the human being, but to the concept of rational explanation, i.e. to a particular form of inference that is logical or conceptual, not inductive. What a human being does is described as an action in so far as the explanation that is given for it is rational and brought under the domain of enquiry of the Geisteswissenschaften. If no rational explanation is available, then what the human being does will be a mere event or bodily movement and brought under the domain of enquiry of the Naturwissenschaften. Since the concept of action is tied to that of rational explanation, rather than to that of the human being, there is no need to identify human beings with rational beings in order to understand their bodily movements as actions. What is required is the employment of a certain kind of explanation which, as we have pointed out, is rational rather than inductive. Of course, we will choose to explain human beings (rather than cats and dogs) as acting in the full sense, i.e. as acting rationally, to the extent that we believe them to better approximate the ideal of a purely rational being, but no such identification of the human being with the rational being is required in order to describe what human beings do by using the vocabulary of action. What is required is the application of a certain form of inference. The view that the standard conception of rationality is guilty of logical fetishism rests on the assumption that we need to identify human beings with rational beings in order to view them as agents. Yet this is not Collingwood’s claim. It is by adopting a particular kind of explanation that we describe what a human being does as an action, rather than as an event, not by identifying the human being with the rational agent, thereby conflating “actions”, understood as an empirical or class concept (the sum total of human bodily movements), with “actions” understood as a transcendental or meta-level concept which defines the domain of enquiry of the sciences of mind, sciences which for Collingwood are normative or, as he would put it, “criteriological”. It is what Heidegger would have called the “forgetting of the ontological difference” between “Actions” with a capital A (i.e. meta-level concepts of fundamental ontology) and actions with a small “a”, i.e. the concepts of an empirical anthropology, that promotes the view that the standard conception of rationality over-idealises the human being and leads to the charge of logical fetishism.
The final point I would like to address concerns the metaphysical implications of Stueber’s argument for the explanatory autonomy of folk-psychology. In this book Stueber does not address the metaphysical issue of mental causation and the threat that the possibility of mind-body interaction would pose to the presumption of the causal closure of the physical realm (see pp. 47-48). Stueber’s metaphysical commitments, however, are hinted at in chapter 5 where he describes the relation between the macroscopic properties of the special sciences and the microscopic properties of physics as one of supervenience. His view, contra Kim, is that the relation of supervenience does not pose a threat to the causal closure of the physical. The view that it does pose a threat arises from a conflation of issues of ontology and epistemology. And these ought to be kept apart, so Stueber argues. There are many epistemologies, but there is only one ontology. One can defend the explanatory autonomy of the special sciences by showing that they have distinct ways of knowing. But such epistemological diversity has no ontological repercussions.
Stueber’s view of the relationship between the sciences is far removed from the one which informs Collingwood’s defence of the explanatory autonomy of history. Collingwood’s claim that there are different senses of “cause” or “because” at work in different explanatory practices is formulated against the background of a “bifurcated” rather than a “layered” or hierarchical view of the sciences. Thus for Collingwood the relationship between basic and special sciences is less like the relation holding between Lockean primary and secondary qualities and more like the relation between what Heidegger calls the “present-at-hand” and the “ready-to-hand”. It is a distinction of “fundamental ontology” that determines a priori the reality with which we are concerned. For Collingwood, unlike Stueber, ontological questions cannot be completely divorced from epistemological ones for the kind of things there are (actions/events) depend on the investigative goals of a science and the kind of inferences that are peculiar to it. Indeed, for Collingwood, there is no such thing as ontology understood as a science of pure being, of what there is, independently of the a priori categories and relative forms of judgment through which what there is can be known. Collingwood’s discussion of re-enactment is located against the background of a metaphysics without ontology, a metaphysics which, unlike traditional ontology, is concerned not with the investigation of pure Being but of the a priori categories that govern explanations in different forms of enquiry. The point of the re-enactment doctrine is to show that to understand something as an action is to understand it in a very distinctive way by employing explanations that have a logical structure that differs from those of natural science. Stueber’s defence of the epistemic centrality of empathy, by contrast, is based on a layered view of the sciences which provides no serious challenge to the naturalistic assumptions, which form the background for the debate between theory theory and simulation theory. Indeed it is not meant as a challenge to naturalism.
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